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ABSTRACT
Any plausible consequentialist theory should fulfill  the following intuitions: (a) if an agent satisfies the theory she  
should produce the best possible consequences she can in that situation, (b) if all agents satisfy the theory they should 
produce the best possible consequences as a group, and (c) all agents should, in fact, be able to satisfy the theory. This  
thesis shows that while act-, rule- and cooperative consequentialism each fails to fulfill at least one of these intuitions, 
generalized act-consequentialism is successful by directing itself to both collective and individual agents. It is further  
argued that  these  collectives  act  only in  a  weak sense,  according to  which  they need  not  have  the  ability to  act  
intentionally,  or  to  entertain  beliefs  or  desires.  This  opens  up  the  possibility  for  a  new  theory,  collective  
consequentialism, which directs itself only to the collective agent constituted by all other agents.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
When citizens fail to rise against a dictator, we blame their individual self-concern. Had they all  
acted in the common good, we believe they would have deposed the tyrant and reinstated a rule of 
the people. But sadly, this need not be true. Even if each individual does what is best, the group as a  
whole may fail to bring about the best possible consequences. It may be true of each individual that 
had she tried to protest, she would only have provoked a harsh crackdown without weakening the 
regime. Because of this, each agent would do her best by remaining passive. Paradoxically, their  
joint wrongdoing would make each of their acts right.
This problem have long troubled those consequentialists who search for a theory of rightness, or 
for some criterion of which acts are right. It is particularly worrisome for act-consequentialism, 
which holds that each agent ought to produce the best consequences she can, but which cannot also 
guarantee that our acts are coordinated in the right ways. Two other theories have sometimes been 
offered as alternatives: rule-consequentialism, which calls for each agent to follow an ideal set of 
rules, and cooperative consequentialism, which requests that the agent cooperate with others. In this 
thesis, I show how all of these theories are defective in some regard. Merely telling individuals what 
to do is a non-starter. 
As of today, the only successful solution to this problem is provided by so called generalized act-
consequentialism,  which  directs  itself  to  both  individual  and  collective  agents.  Incorporating 
collective agents into a consequentialist theory is controversial, but as I shall argue, a weaker view 
of collective agency can be made plausible enough. The best consequentialist theory is therefore a 
collectivist one. When we fail to do our best as a group, it is the collective which has done wrong.
The disposition of the thesis goes as follows. Section two suggests three intuitions which any 
consequentialist  theory  of  rightness  should  fulfill.  Section  three  shows  how  act-  and  rule-
consequentialism fail  to  fulfill  our  first  or  second intuitions  as  a  result  of  certain coordination 
problems, and section four demonstrates how cooperative consequentialism is successful only when 
it fails to fulfill our third intuition. Section five suggests that these results are likely to hold for all 
theories  directing  themselves  to  only  individual  agents,  and  section  six  moves  on  to  discuss 
generalized act-consequentialism and its inclusion of collective agents in morality. Finally, section 
seven suggests a new theory: collective consequentialism. 
2 (28)
2.  THREE INTUITIONS
Consequentialist theories combines some axiological account of which consequences are good with 
a  theory  of  rightness.  Regarding  which  consequences  are  good,  the  literature  abounds  with 
suggestions. For example, utilitarians claim that the best outcome is a possible state of affairs which 
contains the maximum total utility, but they differ on how to interpret this claim: while hedonist  
utilitarians claim that maximum utility consists in the maximum amount of pleasure minus pain, 
preference utilitarians argue that it consists in the maximum amount of satisfied preferences minus 
frustrated preferences. Other consequentialists take a broader stance than the mere promotion of 
utility.  For  example,  some  include  loyalty  and  friendship  as  directly  contributing  to  the  best 
outcome. In what follows, I say little of such questions of which consequences are good, and I 
expect most views of goodness to be compatible with the theories I am to discuss. Also, note that 
while many philosophers cited in the text speak of utilitarianism rather than consequentialism, these 
differences concern mostly which consequences are good, and not which theory of rightness is 
correct. Since I bracket the question of goodness in its entirety, I choose to speak consistently of 
consequentialism. This should not affect any of the conclusions which follows.
When  discussing  which  theory  of  rightness  is  correct,  my  aim  is  to  find  an  adequate 
consequentialist  criterion  of  which  acts  are  right,  rather  than to  suggest  a  method  of  decision 
making, a theory which we should try to follow, or even one we should accept.1 Furthermore, I am 
concerned with the objective  consequences  of  our  acts;  that  is,  with  the  actual  rather  than the 
expected outcomes. In short, I am interested in which theory of rightness we ought to successfully 
follow, and I will adopt the common usage of saying that an agent satisfies a theory whenever the 
agent has achieved whatever requirements the theory directs her to fulfill. Whether a theory directs 
itself to an agent is indicated in the beginning of each statement of the theory.
To choose between different theories of rightness,  we need some criteria which they should 
aspire to fulfill. In what follows, I proceed from three intuitions. The first and second of these have 
been suggested by Donald Regan:2 
Intuition 1: For any theory T, if an agent satisfies T, then that agent should 
1 For a discussion on the difference between consequentialism as a criterion of rightness and a method of decision 
making,  see  R.  E.  Bales,  “Act-utilitarianism:  Account  of  Right-making  Characteristics  or  Decision-making 
Procedure?”, American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (1971), pp. 257-65.
2 Regan's formulations are modified to fit the current text. Instead of intuitions, Regan speaks about two properties 
which different theories can have, which he calls PropCOP and PropAU. See his Utilitarianism and Co-operation 
(New York, 1980), pp. 3-5. 
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produce by her act the best consequences she can possibly produce in that 
situation.
Intuition 2: For any theory T, if all agents satisfy T, then the class of all 
agents should produce by their acts taken together the best consequences 
that they can possibly produce by any pattern of behavior.
The first intuition states that each agent should relate to the best possible consequences by way of  
maximizing those consequences. The second intuition adds that the agents must be coordinated in 
this task, so that they also maximize the best consequences as a group.
Fulfilling  these  two  intuitions  is  a  necessary  constraint,  but  not  a  sufficient  one,  on  any 
consequentialist theory of rightness. In addition, we also want the agents to to be able to satisfy the 
theory. Otherwise we could produce a theory which fulfills our first and second intuitions simply by 
making it impossible for any agent to satisfy. All agents satisfying the theory would then, trivially,  
produce the best consequences possible both individually and as a group. But this is obviously not 
the kind of theory we are looking for. We must therefore add to our first and second intuitions a  
variant of the “ought-implies-can”-principle:
Intuition 3: For any theory T: all agents should be able to satisfy T.3
Our third intuition is simply a plausible extension from our second intuition; if we demand that the 
universal satisfaction of a theory guarantees that the agents produce the best possible consequences 
together, it is reasonable to want such universal satisfaction to be possible. 
3.  ACT- AND RULE-CONSEQUENTIALISM
In this  and the following two sections,  I  assume only the existence of individual  agents.  More 
precisely, I take an individual agent to be an isolated time-slice of a person with a specified list of 
alternative acts open to her. This gives us what we may call an  atomic conception of individual 
agency. On this view a person is made up of a number of individual agents during the course of her 
life. This is perhaps slightly counterintuitive, but upon closer reflection it may seem alright. Our 
3 Note that this is a strong version of the “ought-implies-can”-principle. We are demanding that all agents are able to 
satisfy the theory, rather than that any agent can do so. To see the difference, we need only imagine a theory which 
any agent can satisfy, but which can only be satisfied by one agent at a time. Such a theory fulfills the weaker, but  
not the stronger, version of the “ought-implies-can”-principle. I believe that the stronger version makes more sense  
in the context of our second intuition, but perhaps this can be disputed.
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present  and  future  selves  certainly  differ  from each  other  to  some  extent,  both  regarding  our 
intentions and how we act. For example, yesterday-you may have intended to write a paper, but 
today-you may be more interested in taking a day off. A way to make sense of this discrepancy is to  
say that yesterday-you and today-you are two different agents. This account of individual agency 
also helps us to avoid intrapersonal coordination problems.4 Without it, the problems which we are 
to discuss may simply reappear within the course of a person's life.
Assume now that each agent acts from among her list  of available alternatives, and that she 
produces different consequences depending on which alternative is selected. Let us borrow a term 
from Regan and call theories which directs the agent only to pick one alternative over another for 
exclusively act-oriented.5 Since, by stipulation, agents can always select one of the acts available to 
them, constructing exclusively act-oriented theories makes for an expedient way of fulfilling our 
third intuition. But as Regan and others have argued, such theories cannot at the same time fulfill 
both our first and second intuitions. 
Let us look closer at this claim. Consider first act-consequentialism (abbreviated AC, from this 
point onward):
AC: For each individual agent: The agent ought to do the act which has at 
least as good consequences under the circumstances as any other act open to 
the agent.
As Regan notes, AC clearly fulfills our first intuition.6 If an agent satisfies AC she does the act 
which  has  at  least  as  good  consequences  as  any  other  act;  that  is,  she  produces  the  best 
consequences she can in that situation. 
Furthermore, AC is an exclusively act-oriented theory, since it requires only that the agent does 
one of the acts which are open to her. Since this is something which the agent always can do, AC 
fulfills our third intuition as well.
However, AC does not fulfill the second intuition. Satisfaction by all agents of AC does not 
guarantee that the agents as a group produce the best consequences they can possibly produce by 
any pattern of behavior. This is shown by the following example:7 
4 Cf. Regan, Utilitarianism and Co-operation, p. 150. 
5 Regan, Utilitarianism and Co-operation, pp. 105-23.
6 Regan, Utilitarianism and Co-operation, pp. 17-18.
7 Several  philosophers  have  pressed  this  challenge  against  AC.  See,  for  example,  Allan  F.  Gibbard,  “Rule-
utilitarianism: Merely an Illusory Alternative”,  Australasian Journal of Philosophy 43 (1965), pp. 211-20; Gerald 
Barnes, “Utilitarianisms”,  Ethics 82 (1971), pp. 59-62; Regan,  Utilitarianism and Co-operation, pp. 12-53; Fred 
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Imagine two persons,  Sarah and Joshua,  who are working in a field hospital,  in  which they 
attempt to help a number of wounded patients. Assume that each of them because of the high level 
of noise and the crowded room cannot communicate with or otherwise influence the actions of the 
other. Also, suppose that both Sarah and Joshua can help some moderately wounded patient on their 
own,  thereby producing  a  modest  outcome  (with  a  value  of  6).  On  the  floor  lies  a  seriously 
wounded patient  on a stretcher.  If  both Sarah and Joshua walk over  to  the patient  and lift  the 
stretcher, they carry the patient to a doctor, which results in the best possible outcome (valued 10). 
However, if only one of them walks over, he or she cannot lift the stretcher, while at the same time 
eschewing the opportunity to help another  patient  (valued 3).  This tragic  outcome is  the worst 
possible. The problem for AC is this: if Sarah and Joshua both decide not to walk over and lift the 
stretcher, it is true for each agent that, according to AC, he or she did the right thing. Had Sarah 
walked over, the worst outcome would have resulted. The same goes for Joshua. Strangely enough, 
their joint wrongdoing makes each of their acts right.
The above case is  an example of a  pure coordination game,  played by two consequentialist 
agents with the same evaluation of each pattern of action:
Sarah lifts Sarah does not lift
Joshua lifts 10 3
Joshua does not lift 3 6
Figure 1: Example of pure coordination game.
In this situation, there are two possible situations in which no agent can single-handedly improve 
the outcome by acting otherwise (so called Nash equilibria).  The problem is  that  one of these 
outcomes is sub-optimal. As a result, even if all agents satisfy AC, there is no guarantee that they 
end up in the optimal situation, thereby producing the best consequences together.8 Because of this, 
AC fulfills our first and third, but not our second, intuition.
Could we solve the problem, not by telling each individual to do what is best, but by providing 
each agent with a set of rules to follow? Consider rule-consequentialism (RC):
Feldman, Doing the Best We Can (Dordrecht, 1986), pp. 154-6.
8 It is worth noting a parallel discussion on whether act-consequentialism is even consistent with the production of the 
best consequences possible. Regan has argued for such consistency, though Wlodek Rabinowicz has noted that this 
is true only if the theory gives the agents common aims, which it may fail to do under some circumstances. In what  
follows I presuppose the agents being given common aims as a constraint on any consequentialist theory. For more 
on this, see Regan, Utilitarianism and Co-operation, pp. 54-65; Rabinowicz, “Act-utilitarian Prisoner's Dilemmas”, 
Theoria 55 (1989), pp. 1-44.
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RC: For each individual agent: An act is right if and only if it conforms with 
an ideal set of rules; an ideal set of rules is any set of rules such that if 
everyone always did, from among the things he could do, what conformed 
with that set of rules, then at least as much good would be produced as by 
everyone's always conforming with any other set of rules.9
Suppose a set of rules prescribes that both Sarah and Joshua lift the stretcher. This set of rules is 
ideal, since if both Sarah and Joshua follow these rules, at least as much good would be produced as 
if they conformed with any other set of rules. In this case, when both Sarah and Joshua satisfy RC 
they produce the best outcome together. So it may seem as if RC fulfills our second intuition.
RC clearly fulfills our third intuition. Satisfying RC requires nothing but that the agent selects an 
act available to her; though this act is now recommended by an ideal set of rules rather than, as in  
the case of AC, on the basis of whether it  produces the best consequences.  RC is therefore an 
exclusively act-oriented theory.
Regretfully, however, there are serious defects with RC. One objection goes as follows. Let us 
assume that one agent declines to follow the ideal set of rules. This raises the question of what, in  
such a case of less than universal satisfaction, RC tells everyone else to do.  Return to our first 
example. If Joshua decides not to lift the stretcher, what should Sarah do? Satisfying RC requires 
her to conform with an ideal set of rules, but if these rules tells her simply to lift the stretcher, then  
conforming to them does not lead her to produce the best consequences she can in that situation. In 
this case, given Joshua's intransigence, it  is clear that Sarah ought instead to help a moderately 
wounded patient.
As Regan has argued, the most natural way to solve this problem is to introduce conditional rules 
which prescribe different acts to an agent depending on what the other agents do.10 Suppose that we 
list all the different circumstances which can arise for an agent, and by the side of each item write a 
prescription for action for that agent. The idea is that once a set of rules take into account all the  
possible ways in which Joshua might behave, Sarah's compliance with this set should make her 
produce the best possible consequences she can in that situation.
But according to Regan, this does not work. To see this, let us follow him in considering the  
9 This formulation is fetched from Barnes, “Utilitarianism”, p. 57, and is discussed by Regan in Utilitarianism and 
Co-operation, pp. 90-3. Derek Parfit has recently argued for an almost identical theory, stating that “[e]veryone 
ought to follow the principles of which it is true that, if they were universally followed, things would go best”, in his 
On What Matters (Oxford, 2011), pp. 404-6. Regrettably, Parfit suggests no solution for the problems facing RC.
10 Regan, Utilitarianism and Co-operation, pp. 86-7.
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following two sets of conditional rules:11
Sarah Joshua
If Joshua lifts, lift. If Sarah lifts, lift.
If Joshua does not lift, do not lift. If Sarah does not lift, lift anyway.
Figure 2: Ideal conditional rules, set A.
Sarah Joshua
If Joshua lifts, lift. If Sarah lifts, lift.
If Joshua does not lift, lift anyway. If Sarah does not lift, do not lift.
Figure 3: Ideal conditional rules, set B.
Both of these sets are ideal, since the universal satisfaction of any set would cause the agents to 
produce the best possible consequences together. But suppose that both Sarah and Joshua do not lift 
the stretcher.  Both of them satisfy RC, since each of them follows an ideal set  of rules:  Sarah 
follows set A, and Joshua follows set B. Each agent also produces the best consequences he or she 
can in that situation. But they do not produce the best possible consequences as a group. Just as AC, 
RC fails to fulfill our second intuition.
Another problem concerns the possibility of there existing multiple ideal sets of rules.12 This 
point is best made by considering a case with two equally good outcomes. Take a different example 
with Amanda and John, where the benefit of both agents helping a moderately wounded patient on 
their own is four units higher. The outcome is illustrated by the following matrix:
Amanda lifts Amanda does not lift
John lifts 10 5
John does not lift 5 10
Figure 4: Example of game with multiple best outcomes.
Suppose Amanda lifts the stretcher, while John does not lift. Both of them satisfy RC, since each 
conform to an ideal  sets  of rules;  i.e.  had both either lifted or not lifted the stretcher,  the best 
consequences would have been brought about. But since they conform to different sets of rules, 
neither of them produces the best possible consequences on their own. Nor do both of them produce 
11 Regan, Utilitarianism and Co-operation, pp. 90-3. 
12 This has been argued by Jordan Howard Sobel, “Rule-utilitarianism”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 46 (1968), 
pp. 154-55, and Regan, Utilitarianism and Co-operation, pp. 83-93. 
8 (28)
the best consequences together. In fact, RC would fulfill neither our first or second intuition.13
We may think that this problem can be solved by referring to a salient feature or focal point in 
the formulation of our theory, thereby somehow guiding the agents to pick the same set of ideal 
rules. For example, Brad Hooker has suggested that we follow the ideal set of rules which lies 
closest to the set of conventionally accepted rules.14 But Hooker's suggestion suffers from similar 
problems. First, he does not explain what to do when two ideal sets of rules lies equally close to the  
conventionally accepted set of rules. And second, there could be multiple sets of conventionally 
accepted rules as well. 
How serious is this problem for RC? Somehow RC needs to recommend a specific ideal set of 
rules, but it is not clear how it may accomplish this. Perhaps RC is a plausible method of decision  
making, or a theory we should accept. But as a theory of rightness it is just as defective as AC.
4.  COOPERATIVE CONSEQUENTIALISM
If coordination problems arise because each agent is acting on her own, perhaps we should require 
that  the  agents  cooperate?  Let  us  label  such theories  under  the  fitting  heading  of  cooperative 
consequentialism (CC). Can CC help us to bypass the problems facing AC and RC?
Regan has suggested a variant of CC, according to which each agent ought to cooperate with 
whoever else is cooperating, thereby producing the best possible consequences given the behavior 
of non-cooperators. This theory takes the form of a certain procedure which the agents must go 
through, of which a rough sketch goes as follows:
CC1: For each individual agent:
(a) the agent should hold herself ready to cooperate with other cooperators,
(b) the agent should determine which other agents:
(i) hold themselves ready to cooperate, 
(ii) understand the basic situation, and
(iii) correctly identify other cooperators,
13 Note that the second example is not a problem for AC. If Amanda chooses to lift and John chooses not to lift, neither 
of them have satisfied AC. For Amanda, not lifting the stretcher would be the better alternative, while for John, 
lifting the stretcher would be better. 
14 For Hooker's discussion on multiple ideal sets of rules, see his Ideal Code, Real World (Oxford, 2002), pp. 2-3, 114-
17. His formulation of RC differs significantly from those considered here. According to him, those acts are wrong 
which are forbidden by the set of rules whose internalization by the overwhelming majority of everyone everywhere  
in each new generation has maximum expected value in terms of well-being (with some priority for the worst off). 
Also, note that Hooker's theory considers the expected rather than the actual consequences of our acts.
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(c) the agent should determine which agents are not available to be 
cooperated with and how these agents are disposed to behave,
(d) the agent should determine the best possible pattern of behavior for the 
group of cooperators, given the behavior of non-cooperators,
(e) the agent should do her part in the best possible pattern of behavior for 
the class of cooperators.15
CC1 is according to Regan part of a possibly larger group of similar solutions. Also, CC1 is only a 
rough sketch of Regan's final theory, because of a number of logical difficulties. I will not go into 
any detailed exposition of these problems. Suffice to say that Regan introduces a more complicated 
procedure which while elaborate solves all  or at  least  most of the logical difficulties.16 For my 
purposes it is sufficient to consider the more intuitive procedure CC1.
Also, note that according to CC1, to be a cooperator is simply to be an agent who satisfies CC1, 
a usage which may or may not coincide with out pre-philosophical intuitions about what it means to 
cooperate. This is not of any importance here; we are merely interested in whether CC1 fulfills our 
three intuitions. 
Finally,  Regan  claims  that  having  the  agents  move  through  this  procedure  should  not  be 
interpreted in a  temporal fashion.17 Obviously,  conceiving of going through these steps without 
simultaneously assuming the passage of time is somewhat difficult. It becomes slightly easier if we 
remember that Regan's procedure is not primarily meant as a method of decision making, but is 
rather a way of ensuring that the agents have done whatever is required of them. At any rate, let us 
grant Regan that this can be done.
How can  CC1 solve  our  previous  problems?  First,  it  appears  to  fulfill  our  first  intuition.18 
Consider, for example, a case where Joshua satisfies CC1 and Sarah does not. Since Joshua satisfies 
15 Regan, Utilitarianism and Co-operation, pp. 124-45. Note that, strictly speaking, CC1 does not just give an account  
of what we ought to do or which acts are right, but also requires us to move through a certain procedure and to hold  
certain beliefs. It is not entirely correct to characterize this as a criterion of which acts are right. Nevertheless, since  
theories based upon cooperation have been suggested as a solution to the coordination problems discussed earlier, it  
will be worthwhile to see why these solutions fail.
16 The interested reader is encouraged to consult Regan's extended argument in Utilitarianism and Co-operation, pp. 
146-63, 212-28. 
17 Regan, Utilitarianism and Cooperation, pp. 212-14.
18 CC1 is designed by Regan to be a theory which fulfills both our first and second intuition. Regan actually tries to  
prove that CC1 has an even stronger property, which he calls adaptability. Since adaptability is stronger than, and 
entails, our first and second intuitions (PropAU and PropCOP, in Regan's terminology), this does not affect my 
discussion of Regan's view. 
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CC1,  Joshua  holds  himself  ready  to  cooperate  with  all  other  cooperators.  Consequently,  he 
determines that he himself is available to be cooperated with. He then determines that Sarah is not  
available to be cooperated with, and determines how she is disposed to behave. If Sarah lifts the 
stretcher, the best plan for Joshua is to lift the stretcher as well. If Sarah does not lift the stretcher, 
the best plan for Joshua is to not lift the stretcher. In both cases Joshua produces the best possible 
consequences he can.
CC1 also seems to fulfill our second intuition. If both Joshua and Sarah satisfy CC1, they hold 
themselves ready to cooperate with each other. They then correctly determine that both of them are 
cooperators. Upon doing so, they find no non-cooperators. They subsequently determine their best 
possible pattern of behavior for the group, which is to lift the stretcher. Finally, they do their part in 
this  optimal  pattern.  So if  both Joshua and Sarah satisfy CC1,  they both lift  the  stretcher  and 
produce the best possible consequences together. 
Wary of the challenges facing RC, we may wonder if CC1 avoids the problem with multiple best 
plans. Recall the case of John and Amanda. In their case, both of them either lifting or not lifting the 
stretcher produces the best possible consequences. But to achieve either of these outcomes,  the 
agents must embark on the same best plan (for the class of cooperators). As in the case of RC, it  
may be possible for John and Amanda to satisfy CC1 even as they pick different best plans, thereby 
failing to produce the best possible consequences together. 
Regan solves this problem by suggesting that we, in his more detailed variant of CC1, can add to 
the procedure that the agents choose between the plans at random, and wait with carrying out their 
acts until they all have selected the same best plan.19 This is possible because CC1 in its more 
complicated version involves several  looping stages  where the agents return to a previous step 
unless they fulfill certain conditions. Assuming that the number of plans are finite, Regan plausibly 
suggests that the agents eventually end up with the same plan. So the detailed version of CC1 can 
accomplish  what  RC cannot,  because  Regan  demands  that  the  agents  go  through  a  particular 
procedure.20
At this point the reader may suspect that requiring the agents to have certain beliefs, or moving 
through a particular procedure, is itself a considerable source of complication. The reader would be 
correct. In fact, three problems have been discussed in the literature, two of which are discussed by 
Regan himself. 
First, we may agree with Earl Conee that it is highly implausible that no act is morally correct 
19 Regan, Utilitarianism and Co-operation, p. 162, 261.
20 But this need not imply that  the agents  should use a particular method for  decision making.  That agents have 
followed the procedure is simply a way of deciding whether the agents have done what is right.
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unless selected by a particular procedure.21 In fact, Conee notes that it is in such a case likely that no 
act has ever been right according to CC1 (!), since it is unlikely that any agent has ever been able to  
ascertain the behavior of all non-cooperators. And if some agents cannot satisfy CC1, the theory 
does not fulfill our third intuition.
Second, the theory also violates our third intuition in a more direct way.22 CC1 tells us that we 
ought to go through a certain procedure, or that we should acquire certain beliefs. But there is no 
guarantee that we have the ability to perform any of these tasks.
Third, there are Regan's so-called “Mad Telepath”-examples.23 We imagine a third party, a “Mad 
Telepath”, which in the event of us carrying through with a particular procedure or successfully 
acquiring certain attitudes or beliefs,  will  do some destructive act,  such as bombing a hospital, 
which makes the total consequences produced worse. Also, note that theories evaluating only the 
consequences of individual acts have no problems with mad telepaths, since the consequences of 
the telepath bombing the hospital may then be included in the evaluation of the act. The possibility 
of these side effects constitute a specific problem for CC1, because CC1 requires something more 
than simply having the agents perform certain acts. In fact, this suggests a more general argument 
against CC1: whenever we go beyond the mere consequences of acts, we can always imagine a 
third party hindering the best consequences being brought about. In these cases, the best action 
would be to not follow CC1. Or, in other words, we can always construct a scenario under which 
doing some act other than that endorsed by CC1 will result in better consequences. Because of this, 
CC1 fails to fulfill, not only our third intuition, but our first and second as well.
Regan admits that this is a real problem, and agrees that CC1 is “not perfect”.24 He goes on to 
suggest that no theory can be perfect. Perhaps this is true for theories considering only individual 
agents, but as will be shown later this does not hold for those theories including collective agents as 
well. At any rate, CC1 is clearly defective. Is there a more plausible alternative?
Michael Zimmerman has discussed two other variants of CC.25 Zimmerman is mainly interested 
21 Earl  Conee,  “Utilitarianism  and  Co-operation,  by  Donald  Regan.  Review  by:  Earl  Conee”,  The  Journal  of  
Philosophy 80 (1983), pp. 420-2.
22 Conee, “Utilitarianism and Co-operation, by Donald Regan. Review by: Earl Conee”, p. 421; Regan, Utilitarianism 
and Co-operation, pp. 173-6.
23 Regan, Utilitarianism and Co-operation, pp. 176-81. 
24 Regan, Utilitarianism and Co-operation, pp. 181-5. See also Sobel, “Utilitarianism and Cooperation”, Dialogue 24 
(1985), pp. 150-2.
25 Zimmerman,  The  Concept  of  Moral  Obligation (Cambridge,  1996),  pp.  254-76.  For  an  earlier  and  somewhat 
different presentation, see his “Cooperation and Doing the Best One Can”, Philosophical Studies 65 (1992), pp. 295-
301. Also, see Feldman, Doing the Best We Can, pp. 173-8.
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in the concept of moral obligation, and his solution is broader in scope than the more narrow search 
for a consequentialist theory of rightness. The context of this discussion therefore differs slightly 
from Zimmerman's. This is not a problem, since my aim is not to argue against Zimmerman's view. 
I am content with showing that his view cannot aid the consequentialist who tries to appease our 
three intuitions.
According to a rough sketch of Zimmerman's first theory, each individual agent ought to both (a) 
do the best she can in that situation, and (b) enable the other members of the group, of which she is  
a member, to produce the best possible consequences available to the group.
It is easy to see how this theory supplies a natural way of dealing with our first and second 
intuitions. While condition (a) ensures that our theory fulfills the first intuition, condition (b) helps 
us to fulfill the second. Let us once again consider the case with Joshua and Sarah. We can show 
that whenever both Sarah and Joshua fulfill these two conditions, they both lift the stretcher, since 
for one agent to lift the stretcher is the only way for him or her to enable the other agent to lift as 
well. So when both Joshua and Sarah satisfy this theory, they both lift the stretcher and produce the 
best possible consequences they can, both as individuals and as a group.
Let us consider a more formal statement of Zimmerman's theory. To see how (b) is constructed, 
we first have to introduce Zimmerman's notion of openness.26 Assume that S is an individual agent 
distinct  from  G,  and  that  G is  a  group  of  individual  agents,  possibly  with  just  one  member. 
Zimmerman now defines openness as follows: S is open to G concerning p if and only if (a) {S, G} 
[the group of S and G] can act so that p is true; and (b) G can act so that p is true.27
To make this more clear, let us illustrate with our first stretcher case. Ask yourself what it takes 
for Sarah to be open to Joshua. According to the definition of openness, Sarah is open to Joshua 
26 Openness should, according to Zimmerman, be understood as the adoption of an attitude, though as Brian Kierland 
notices, this “attitude” is plausibly understood not as based on the agent having certain beliefs, but rather as saying  
something about the state of the agent's environment. See Kierland's “Cooperation, 'Ought Morally', and Principles 
of Moral Harmony”, Philosophical Studies 128 (2006), p. 390. 
27 Zimmerman's account of openness is found in his  The Concept of Moral Obligation,  pp. 265-7. In the following 
discussion I leave out Zimmerman's references to different time frames, both in his definition of openness and in the  
more formal  statements of  his theories.  His  full  definition of openness  goes as  follows: “S is  open at  T  to  G 
concerning p at T' if and only if (a) {S, G} [the group of S and G] can at T so act at T' that p is true; and (b) G can at 
T so act at T' that p is true”. There are two reasons for excluding this extra complexity. First, while distinguishing  
between time frames could help the agents to coordinate their actions, this is true only if they can communicate with 
each other or otherwise influence the other agent, which is something the agents in our examples, by stipulation,  
cannot  do.  Second,  on  my  account  of  individual  agency,  referring  to  different  time  frames  has  no  obvious 
advantages. There can, for example, never be the case that an individual agent ought at T do something at a later or 
earlier time T', because in this case we are considering two different agents.
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concerning lifting the stretcher if  and only if (a) Sarah and Joshua can together act so that the 
stretcher is lifted, and (b) Joshua can act so that the stretcher is lifted. In the present case, (a) is  
clearly true. But under what circumstances is (b) true? Since Joshua cannot lift the stretcher on his 
own, the only way for him to to lift the stretcher is for Sarah to lift as well. The only way for Sarah  
to be open to Joshua is therefore for her to lift the stretcher.
Keeping this definition of openness in mind, consider now the first of Zimmerman's theories:
CC2: For any individual agent S, S ought to:
(a) do the best that she can; and
(b) for any group of agents G and proposition p, be open to G concerning p 
if and only if {S, G} so acting that p is true is the best that {S, G} can do.28
CC2 seems to fulfill our first intuition. When Joshua satisfies CC2 he does the best he can on his  
own. And vice versa for Sarah. In both cases, the agent satisfying CC2 produces the best possible 
consequences he or she can in that situation.
Moreover, CC2 appears to fulfill our second intuition. Since the only way for Sarah and Joshua 
to satisfy CC2 is to be open to each other, and since the only way for each them to be open to the 
other  is  to  lift  the  stretcher,  their  joint  satisfaction  of  CC2  makes  them  produce  the  best 
consequences as a group.
But whatever the success regarding our first and second intuitions, CC2 fails to fulfill our third. 
Zimmerman discusses the following problem.29 Consider a case where Joshua is intransigent and 
declines to lift the stretcher. What does CC2 tell Sarah to do? According to clause (a), Sarah should 
help a moderately wounded patient, since this would produce the best possible consequences in that 
situation. But clause (b) tells Sarah to remain open to the group of Sarah and Joshua, which she can 
do only if she lifts the stretcher. So regardless of whether Sarah lifts the stretcher or not, she cannot  
satisfy CC2. 
There are other problems with CC2 as well. Zimmerman suggests that whenever the agent is part 
of multiple groups, it may be impossible for the agent to simultaneously be open to all groups. And 
there is a related difficulty concerning the possibility of there existing multiple best plans, which 
Zimmerman does not discuss, but which is made apparent by the case of Amanda and John. In their 
case,  both either lifting or not lifting the stretcher  produces  the optimal  outcome. So openness 
requires Amanda to both lift and not lift the stretcher, which is impossible. So even when the agent 
is not a member of multiple groups, it may be impossible for the agent to satisfy CC2.
28 Zimmerman, The Concept of Moral Obligation, pp. 265-6. 
29 Zimmerman, The Concept of Moral Obligation, pp. 266-7.
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Consider now another theory discussed by Zimmerman, which is meant to solve some of the 
previous difficulties: 
CC3: For any individual agent S, S ought to:
(a) do the best she can; and
(b) for any group of agents G and proposition p, be open to G concerning p 
if and only if
(b1) {S, G} so acting that p is true is the best that {S, G} can do, and
(b2) for any act A', if A' is the best that S can do, then S can both be open to 
G concerning p and do A'.30
This theory is simply CC2 with the added clause (b2), which states that the agent ought only to be 
open to the group if and only if this is compatible with her doing the best she can. Can this theory  
accomplish what the others cannot?
According to CC3, Sarah no longer faces the impossible task of both lifting and not lifting the 
stretcher when Joshua does not lift, because openness is only required when this coincides with her 
doing the best she can. So in one sense, progress has been made. However, the agents may still 
confront the impossible task of having to be open to two different best outcomes at the same time.  
Zimmerman's modification of CC2 is therefore not sufficient for our purposes. Something more is 
needed for the consequentialist.
 But even if we grant that the problem with multiple best outcomes can be solved by introducing 
a more complicated variant of CC3, adding (b2) wrecks havoc with our second intuition.  If all 
agents satisfy CC2, are they guaranteed to produce the best consequences as a group? They are not. 
Consider a case in which both Joshua and Sarah do not lift the stretcher. In such a case, each agent 
picks the best alternative he or she can, which is the alternative of not lifting the stretcher. Since 
openness requires that the agent lifts the stretcher, and since it is not possible both to lift and not lift 
the stretcher, (b2) now rules out openness for both agents. In this situation, Joshua and Sarah both 
satisfy CC2. But their satisfaction of CC2 does not guarantee that they produce the best possible  
consequences as a group.
Zimmerman accepts this tragic result and believes that, in these cases, the individuals do no 
wrong.31 But  this  is  an  unacceptable  conclusion  for  those  who  want  to  maintain  our  second 
intuition.32
30 Zimmerman, The Concept of Moral Obligation, p. 268.
31 Zimmerman, The Concept of Moral Obligation, pp. 266-7.
32 Kierland suggests that while we could revert to the ordinary conception of attitudes as based on beliefs, this would  
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It appears then that CC1, CC2 and CC3, who first promised to free us from the problems which 
AC and RC had us trapped within, can fulfill our first and second intuitions only by breaking our 
third. What has gone wrong?
5.  THE FAILURE OF INDIVIDUALIST THEORIES
The theories which we have considered so far have directed themselves only to individual agents. 
To gain some insight into why success for these theories proves so elusive, it will be worthwhile to 
return  to  our  discussion  about  AC.  Michael  Neumann  has  suggested  that  our  initial  argument 
against AC is faulty,  and that when we have worked out what it means to consult the different  
principles in these situations the problem disappears.33 
Neumann's argument goes as follows. He first distinguishes between general choice situations, in 
which all facts about the world  are not  given, and particular choice situations, in which all such 
facts  are given.34 Particular choice situations can be generated from general ones by determining 
facts about the world. To illustrate with our popular stretcher case, Joshua and Sarah are initially, 
when the example is presented, situated in the general choice situation in which the outcomes which 
are possible and the value of each outcome are given; and in which the alternatives the agents will 
choose are not. By imposing additional constraints on this situation, by for example supposing that 
the agents do not in fact lift the stretcher, we transform the general situation into a particular one, 
and thereby place ourselves in a position to evaluate whether the agents satisfy AC. Satisfaction of 
theories  such  as  AC can  happen  only in  particular  choice  situations,  since  it  is  only  in  these 
situations that the acts produce determinate consequences. If we do not know which act Joshua 
carries out, Sarah's act produces no determinate consequences.
Neumann now suggests two different ways of understanding the phrase “the best consequences 
possible”.35 Either we understand it as (a) the best consequences that are logically possible, or as (b) 
the best consequences that are possible within the confines of the given choice situation. Consider 
first  sense (a).  While it is logically possible that Joshua and Sarah could have reached a better  
outcome through being in  a better  particular  choice situation,  this  is  not surprising.  Of course, 
just reintroduce the threat from mad telepaths. In fact, CC seems predestined to be thrown between violating the  
“ought-implies-can”-principle and facing third party threats. Kierland's own solution is to evaluate agents rather than 
acts. Such a solution, while interesting, clearly does not help our current project, which is concerned with finding 
some theory of rightness, not of the evaluation of character. For more on this, see Kierland, “Cooperation, 'Ought  
Morally', and Principles of Moral Harmony”, pp. 399-401.
33 Michael Neumann, “Co-ordination and Utility”, The Philosophical Quarterly 39 (1989), pp. 66-74.
34 Neumann, “Co-ordination and Utility”, pp. 68-70.
35 Neumann, “Co-ordination and Utility”, p. 70.
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Neumann argues, they could have achieved better results if they were in a better choice situation.36 
This is simply to say that, had things been different, a better outcome could have been brought 
about. It is possible that either Joshua or Sarah had been in the different choice situation where the 
other agent lifted the stretcher, but it is also possible that they had been in a situation in which not  
lifting the stretcher produced a value of twelve rather than ten. Neumann suggests that because of 
this  “no plausible  moral  theories  will  [fulfill  our  second intuition]  in  sense  (a)  –  in  the  sense 
guaranteeing the best logically possible outcome”.37
If we, on the other hand, understand “the best possible consequences” in sense (b), the problem 
disappears.38 In such a particular choice situation it is stipulated that the other agent does or does not 
lift, because the fact of what the other agent will do is given. If Sarah is certain that Joshua will not  
lift  the stretcher,  then she should not lift  either:  by not  lifting,  she makes sure that  the agents 
produce the best consequences together, as are possible in the confines of this particular choice 
situation. Because of this, the example of Sarah and Joshua fails, and theories such as AC fulfill our 
second intuition. 
Now,  I  believe  that  Neumann  contributes  some important  insights,  but  that  he  nevertheless 
misses the gist of the difficulty. It seems that we are looking not for a sense (a) or (b), but rather a 
third sense (c) of “best consequences possible”, namely the best consequences that are possible in 
cases where all facts are given except the behavior of all agents. 
It is not difficult to explain why (c) is interesting for a moral theory: we may believe that moral 
theory is concerned with us navigating a world populated by a multitude of agents, all of which are  
equipped with some weaker or stronger sense of free will, but where everything else runs according 
to  the  laws  of  nature.  The problem is  that  in  these  situations,  there  remains  for  any agent  an 
undetermined factor: the behavior of the other agents is not given.39 As we have seen, since the 
behavior of the other agents is not given, we may sometimes fail to coordinate our actions with 
them in the appropriate ways, or fail to embark on the same best plan. 
To ensure that the agents execute the same optimal pattern, the theories considered so far would 
need to direct themselves to  all  agents at  once.  But  in their  present form, these theories direct 
themselves  only  to  one  individual  agent  at  a  time.  As  long  as  there  exists  such  unpleasant 
36 Neumann, “Co-ordination and Utility”, p. 70, 72.
37 Neumann, “Co-ordination and Utility”, p. 72.
38 Neumann, “Co-ordination and Utility”, p. 70.
39 We can now see another difficulty with CC1. CC1 asks of us to ascertain the behavior of non-cooperators, but this is  
something we must now assume is impossible. In a situation (c) we do not know the behavior of non-cooperators, 
anymore than we know the behavior of cooperators. It is quite strange, as Regan does, to suppose that we can know 
the behavior of non-cooperators, but not the behavior of cooperators.
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possibilities  as  those  facing  Joshua,  Sarah,  Amanda  and  John,  we should  therefore  expect  the 
coordination problems to persist. The alternative is to fulfill our first and second intuitions only by 
violating our third. 
At this point we may suspect that all theories directing themselves only to individual agents are 
bound to fail. How can we modify our theory so that we direct ourselves to several agents at once? 
One possibility,  which is  briefly considered by Neumann,  is  to introduce collective agents into 
morality.40 
6.  GENERALIZED ACT-CONSEQUENTIALISM
How does the introduction of collective agents solve our problem? Recall our three intuitions:
Intuition 1: For any theory T, if an agent satisfies T, then that agent should 
produce by her act the best consequences she can possibly produce in that 
situation.
Intuition 2: For any theory T, if all agents satisfy T, then the class of all 
agents should produce by their acts taken together the best consequences 
that they can possibly produce by any pattern of behavior.
Intuition 3: For any theory T: all agents should be able to satisfy T.
Let us assume that, in addition to the individual agents considered so far, each collection of two or 
more agents constitutes an additional collective agent.41 This ontological commitment needs to be 
argued for. But suppose for now, by hypothesis, that these collectives are agents who are capable of 
acting. How could this assumption aid the consequentialist? 
Some philosophers have suggested a theory of generalized act-consequentialism (GAC):42
40 Neumann, “Co-operation and Utility”, p. 74.
41 Two comments are in order. First, an alternative is to define all agents in terms of collective agents, by stating that a  
collective  agent  is  constituted  by  one  or  more  agents.  However,  I  believe  that  ordinary  language  is  better 
accommodated if we consider as a group or collective an entity constituted by two or more agents. Second, we could 
admit only individuals,  but not collectives,  as members of collectives. I  can see no dangers with such a sparse  
ontology, at least not for the present purposes, but no apparent advantages either. I shall therefore take the more 
generous view, though I must stress that any of the two views will be consistent with my conclusions. 
42 This theory was first suggested by Lars Bergström in “Vad är nyttomoral?” [“What is utilitarianism?”], Filosofi och 
samhälle,  ed.  Gunnar  Andrén  et  al.  (Bodafors,  1978),  pp.  32-4;  and  B.  C.  Postow  in  “Generalized  Act 
Utilitarianism”,  Analysis  37  (1977),  pp.  49-52.  It  has  been  defended  by  Torbjörn  Tännsjö  in  “The  Myth  of 
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GAC: For any individual or collective agent: The agent ought to do the act 
which has at least as good consequences under the circumstances as any 
other act open to the agent.
According to GAC, when Sarah and Joshua fail to lift the stretcher, there is a third agent which fails  
to do the act which would produce the best possible consequences, namely the collective of Sarah 
and Joshua.
We can show that GAC fulfills all  of our three intuitions. First,  as in the case of AC, if  an 
individual or collective agent satisfies GAC, the agent picks the alternative which produces the best 
possible consequences in that situation. GAC therefore fulfills our first intuition.
Second, if all agents satisfy GAC, this means that the collective agent constituted by all other 
agents  produces  the  best  possible  consequences  in  that  situation.  Since  this  collective  agent 
produces the best consequences possible, this means that there is no alternative pattern of behavior 
for  all  agents which would produce better  consequences.  All  agents therefore produce the best 
consequences as a group. GAC therefore fulfills our second intuition as well.
Third, GAC requires nothing from each agent but that she picks the best alternative available to 
her. As in the case of all other theories exclusively concerned with directing each agent to do some 
act, GAC fulfills our third intuition as well.
Let us now turn to the question of whether collectives can act. In what sense could this be true? 
The easiest way to introduce collective agents into our ontology would be on a pragmatic basis. 
Since we need collective agents to explain what we ought to do, we may think ourselves entitled to 
assume their existence on pragmatic grounds. 
However, perhaps we want some additional constraints on which entities may be classified as 
agents.  One  reasonable  requirement  is  for  the  agent  to  have  been  able  to  do  otherwise.  Our 
collective agents clearly fulfill this criteria. Had one of its individual members done otherwise, the 
collective would have acted otherwise as well. 
Another  requirement  would  be  to  demand  some  connection  between  acting  and  acting 
intentionally. But what could such a relationship look like? Requiring that all acts are intentionally 
carried out may seem enticing, but such a claim is too strong. For instance, when I intend to drink a 
cup of coffee but mistakenly drink a cup of water, the latter event is an act, even if it is not an 
Innocence: On Collective Responsibility and Collective Punishment”, Philosophical Papers 36 (2007), pp. 295-314; 
“The  Morality  of  Collective  Actions”,  The  Philosophical  Quarterly  39  (1989),  pp.  221-8;  and  Hedonistic  
Utilitarianism (Edinburgh, 1998), pp. 54-62. Also, see Parfit,  Reasons and Persons  (Oxford,  1984),  pp. 67-86; 
Feldman, Doing the Best We Can, pp. 160-2; Jan Österberg, Self and Others: A Study of Ethical Egoism (Dordrecht, 
1988), pp. 177-80.
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intentional one.
In  a  now  classic  paper,  Donald  Davidson claims  that  these  acts  which  are  not  themselves 
intentional are instead intentional under some other description.43 For example, “I drink a cup of 
water” can  be redescribed as  “I  intentionally drink  what  I  believe to  be coffee”.  According to 
Davidson then, someone is the agent of an act if what she does can be redescribed as intentional.44 
We could  describe  this  as  letting  the  non-intentional  acts  inherit  their  status  as  acts  from the 
intentional ones. 
Perhaps the collectivist could try a similar maneuver as well.45 Just as events such as “I drink a 
cup of water” and “I intentionally drink what I believe to be coffee” are acts, the same would be 
true for “the collective agent lifts the stretcher”. Let me suggest two ways in which this could be 
carried out.
A weaker view could hold that for a collective to be the agent of an act, it is sufficient that the  
individuals act intentionally. “The collective agent lifts the stretcher” would thus be an act in virtue 
of it  being redescribable as “Sarah intentionally lifts  the stretcher,  Joshua intentionally lifts  the 
stretcher”. On this weaker view, while the collective can act, it need not have the capacity to intend 
to act in certain ways. Nor need it be able to take decisions, cherish beliefs etc. In a sense, we might  
say that the collective act inherits its status as an act from the intentional acts of its individual  
members.
Conversely, a stronger view holds that collectives as such have specifically collective intentions. 
Torbjörn Tännsjö seems to hold such a view.46 According to Tännsjö, the collective intention is 
made up by a  complex  conjunction  of  all  the  individual  intentions.  As  a  result,  the  collective 
intention has a  different content from that of any of the individual intentions.  To illustrate,  the 
collective of Sarah and Joshua can intend that "Sarah lifts the stretcher, Joshua lifts the stretcher”,  
even though neither  Sarah nor Joshua has  this  complex intention.  Also,  Tännsjö holds that  the 
collective has certain collective beliefs and desires, and that we may think of these as “represented 
by a matrix where the relevant beliefs and desires of each individual making up the collectivity are 
represented”.47
43 Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford, 1980), pp. 43-61.
44 Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events, pp. 44-7.
45 For two attempts to use Davidson's account of agency to defend a collectivist position, see Tännsjö, “The Morality 
of  Collective Actions”,  pp.  226-7,  and  French,  “The Corporation as  a  Moral  Person”,  American Philosophical  
Quarterly 16 (1979), pp. 211-12.
46 Tännsjö,  “The  Morality  of  Collective  Actions”,  p.  227;  Hedonistic  Utilitarianism,  pp.  57-9;  “The  Myth  of 
Innocence: On Collective Responsibility and Collective Punishment”, pp. 300-4. 
47 Tännsjö, “The Myth of Innocence: On Collective Responsibility and Collective Punishment”, pp. 302-3.
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There are two worries with this stronger account of collective agency. First, there may exist no 
straightforward way to derive the complex collective properties solely on the basis of individual 
ones. For example, Björn Petersson has suggested that so called discursive dilemmas  show that 
“complete information about the member's individual beliefs and desires is not sufficient to explain 
the action of a collectivity”.48 
Consider  for  instance  the  following  example  of  a  discursive  dilemma.  The  board  of  an 
international  oil  company  is  about  take  a  majority  vote  on  three  separate  issues,  all  of  them 
concerning whether to start drilling in a foreign country. There are three board members, and three 
separate questions to be decided. The corporate desire, whether to start drilling or not, is itself based 
on the desires of the individual members. The results are as follows:
(a) Should we 
set up the fields?
(b) Should we 
negotiate with 
the foreign 
government?
(c) Should we 
hire foreign 
employees?
(a)&(b)&(c)  
Should we start 
the drilling 
operation?
Mary No Yes Yes No
Carl Yes No Yes No
Elizabeth Yes Yes No No
The Board Yes Yes Yes Yes / No
Figure 5: Example of a discursive dilemma.
There  are  two  procedures  available  to  the  Board.  On  a  premise-based  procedure,  the  Board's 
decision is  the  outcome of  the votes  on each separate  question (the  result  is  “yes”),  and on a 
conclusion-based procedure, the Board's decision is the outcome of each individual's vote on the 
final decision (“no”). The problem is that, even if we know everything about the desires of the 
individuals members, we still cannot determine the desire of the collective. This is possible only if 
we know whether  it  has  used  a  premise-  or  conclusion-based decision  procedure.  And similar 
examples could be set up to show that full information of the individual intentions and beliefs are 
not sufficient to explain the intentions and beliefs of the collective.
Does the existence of discursive dilemmas show that Tännsjö's account is defective? I think not. 
Take,  for  example,  the  premise-based  procedure  in  the  above  example.  It  may seem as  if  the 
collective desires to start the drilling operation. But Tännsjö could reply that the collective desire is 
not the Board's desire to start drilling. Rather, the collective desire is the conjunction of Carl's desire 
to  set  up  the  fields,  Mary's  desire  to  negotiate  with  the  foreign  government,  etc.  And  this 
48 Björn Petersson, “Collective Omissions and Responsibility”, Philosophical Papers 37 (2008), pp. 252-4. Discursive 
dilemmas are discussed by Philip Pettit in his “Responsibility Incorporated”, Ethics 117 (2007), pp. 181-2.
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conjunctive desire,  held by the  collective,  is  clearly reducible  to  the  desires  of  the collective's 
individual members.49
The second problem concerns the metaphysical status of collective intentions, as well as the 
corresponding collective beliefs and desires.  It  is  natural  to think that  human beings  with their 
capacity for centralized decision making have the ability to intentionally carry out certain acts. But 
it seems preposterous to think that collections of spatiotemporally dispersed individuals, many of 
which will never meet or even know about each other's existence, can nevertheless intend to act as a 
collective.50 
Now, Tännsjö suggests that for the collective to entertain the collective intention, we need not 
suppose that the collective is  conscious. He compares the collective to a computer program, and 
suggests  that  we  can  attribute  an  intention  to  a  computer  program  without  at  the  same  time 
supposing  it  is  conscious.51 But  even  if  we  accept  that  acting  intentionally  does  not  require 
consciousness, we still need to establish that a computer program can intend to act in some non-
conscious way. What could give a non-conscious program such a capacity for acting intentionally? 
Well, one plausible suggestion is that such programs have some centralized locus of control, or are 
sufficiently  organized  in  other  ways.  It  seems  plausible  that  it  is  these  features  which  gives 
computer programs the ability to behave in a coordinated manner and to exhibit behavior which is 
consistent with acting intentionally. But the collectives we are discussing are not even remotely 
organized  in  such  ways.  Consider  for  instance  a  number  of  independently  working  computer 
programs.  Even though each of  these  programs are  plausibly described as  acting  intentionally, 
surely the collective of all computer programs is not?
But even if the stronger view is unacceptable, I suggest that Tännsjö could accept the weaker 
view without losing anything important. He could hold that while there exist no such things as 
collective intentions,  the collective nevertheless acts  in  a weaker sense.  If  the stronger view is 
controversial, and if it contributes nothing which the weaker view has not already accomplished, I 
suggest we go with the weaker one. Let us then briefly consider what can be said in favor of the 
49 If “the Board” is not a collective in the sense discussed here, this raises additional questions of the metaphysical  
status of this entity. One possibility is to claim that corporations, and similar entities who can have desires without  
these being reducible to the desires of a set of individuals, are in fact distinct non-human individuals on their own. If  
we consider corporations as individual agents in their own right, the collective agent under consideration here would 
consist of four individuals: Mary, Carl, Elizabeth and the Board (or “The Corporation”). I am not convinced that this  
concept  of  corporate agency is  metaphysically sound,  but at  least  it  is  compatible with the additional  view of 
collective agency discussed here. 
50 This has been argued by Conee, “Hedonistic Utilitarianism”, The Philosophical Review 110 (2001), pp. 429-30.
51 Tännsjö, Hedonistic Utilitarianism, pp. 58-9.
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weaker sense of collective agency.
First, as has already been noted, there are significant advantages for us to assume that collectives 
can  act,  regardless  of  whether  they  do  so  intentionally  or  not.  As  we  have  seen,  none  of  the 
consequentialist  theories  which  directs  themselves  exclusively to  individual  agents  have  so  far 
fulfilled our three intuitions. So if we are looking to accept a consequentialist theory, assuming that  
collectives can act gives us perhaps the only way to formulate an adequate theory of rightness.
Second, there are no apparent disadvantages with the weaker collectivist position. Perhaps we 
could argue that a theory of rightness should concern itself only with those agents who are capable 
of choice and decision making. But it is difficult to explain why this should be the case. Since we 
have already given up the supposition that our theory should be used a method for decision making,  
what remains is merely the somewhat vague idea that it should guide or inform the decisions of 
agents. But this is likely true of only a few individual agents. For many individual agents, our 
theory will lend itself poorly to guide deliberation, and some are perhaps not even able to use our 
theory at all. And if this is the case, we should not be worried about collective agents lacking this  
ability as well.52 
Third,  and  finally,  the  weaker  view  of  collective  agency  provides  a  plausible  way  of 
understanding some cases of conjunctive acts. Examples of conjunctive acts are such as "Sarah 
managed to get  through college",  "John wrote a  book",  and "Amanda went  and bought  an ice 
cream". All of these acts are carried out over large swaths of time, and involve countless other acts. 
On  the  account  of  individual  agency  considered  here,  these  acts  are  carried  out  by  series  of 
individual agents. Now, it may be true that in these cases no single individual agent intended the 
conjunctive act. To give an example, Amanda may first have intended to buy an ice cream, then 
intended to walk down the street, and finally intended to enter a store. But while no single part of 
her ever had the complex intention of "walking down the street, entering the store, and buying the 
ice cream", it still seems reasonable to say that, in some sense, this was precisely what she did. Our 
account of collective agency promises a straightforward way of understanding such conjunctive 
acts: namely as the non-intentional acts of intrapersonal collectives. Accepting that collectives can 
act is therefore not only a reasonable way of viewing interpersonal undertakings, but may help us to 
better understand intrapersonal ones as well.
7.  COLLECTIVE CONSEQUENTIALISM
Assume now that the previous conclusions have been accepted: that no theory considering only 
52 But that the agents cannot use the theory to guide deliberation does not, of course, mean that the agents cannot 
satisfy the theory when put forth as a theory of rightness: that is, as a criterion of which acts are right.
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individual agents fulfills our three intuitions, and that a weak sense of collective agency can be 
introduced to solve this problem. If you are unconvinced by the arguments presented this far, I ask 
that you at least consider them hypothetically correct for the remaining few pages.
While showing that GAC fulfilled our second intuition, I briefly considered the collective agent 
which was constituted by all other agents. Let us call this agent  the universal agent. Is should be 
obvious at this point that it is the universal agent which makes it possible for GAC to fulfill our  
second  intuition.  If  we  exclude  the  universal  agent,  new  coordination  problems  may reappear 
between the other collectives. 
In fact, it seems that the universal agent does its job almost too well. Upon reflection we find 
ourselves in a position where there is nothing left for the individuals to do, and where all of the 
work is carried out by the universal agent. Consider first the case where the universal agent does 
what is right, and where as a result the best outcome is brought about. In this case, no agent has at 
her disposal an alternative act which would bring about a better outcome. So when the universal 
agent does what is right, all other agents do so as well. And similarly, in all cases where an agent 
fails to produce the best possible outcome on her own, there is a corresponding failure for the 
universal  agent;  there  is  in  such cases  an  action  available  to  the  universal  agent  which  would 
produce better consequences.
If  the  individualist  position  had  prevailed,  we  would  have  had  no  reason  to  introduce  any 
collective agents. But why is this so? A reasonable explanation is that theories which manage to 
achieve  equally  good  results  with  fewer  moral  agents  are,  everything  else  being  equal,  at  a 
significant advantage. And it is, I believe, the assumption that collectives are fully reducible to their 
individual members which lies behind the individualists idea that we should not consider collective 
agents  in  moral  theorizing.  Why consider  collective  agents,  we  may  ask,  when  all  the  moral 
wrongdoing of the collective is reducible to the wrongdoing of the individual agents? However, as 
the previous sections have shown, there are strong reasons for consequentialists to accept a weaker 
sense of collective agency. And so the reductionist argument points in the opposite direction: why 
consider individual agents, when all the moral wrongdoing of the individuals is reducible to the 
wrongdoing of the universal agent? 
Consider then collective consequentialism:
COC: For the universal agent: The agent ought to do the act which has at 
least as good consequences under the circumstances as any other act open to 
the agent.
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How does COC handle the case of Sarah and Joshua? While GAC directs itself to three agents:  
Sarah, Joshua and the collective of Sarah and Joshua, COC directs itself only to the collective of 
Sarah and Joshua. According to COC, there is no fact of the matter as to whether Sarah and Joshua 
as individual agents have done what is right or wrong. Just as an advocate of AC can admit the 
existence of collective agents while holding that all the wrongdoing is attributable to individual 
agents (perhaps she mistakenly believes that if all individuals do what is best on their own, the best 
outcome is brought about),  the proponent of COC can admit the existence of individual agents 
while holding that all the wrongdoing is attributable to the universal agent. Or, in other words, COC 
holds that Joshua and Sarah may do whatever they like, as long as the universal agent does what is 
right.
What about our three intuitions? COC fulfills our three intuitions just as well as GAC. COC 
directs itself to only one agent, the universal agent, and whenever this agent produces by its act the 
best possible consequences it can, the best consequences are brought about. And, as in the case of 
all other exclusively act-oriented theories, this act is available to the universal agent.
We may object that COC is a worse theory than GAC because it gives no direction to individual 
agents,  which at  first  sight  may seem a very strange view.  GAC did not  provide a  method of 
decision making, but at least it let some lucky individuals use it for guidance. But it is difficult to 
explain why COC is worse off than GAC when it  comes to guide individual decision making. 
Instead of asking what we ought to do to realize the best possible outcome, we could ask what we 
ought to do as parts of the universal agent. And further, if GAC is really a better theory for guiding 
decision making, then having individuals take their decisions according to GAC (or AC, RC, CC or 
any other theory) is fully compatible with accepting COC as the correct criterion of rightness. 
Another  objection  goes  as  follows:  if  we accept  COC,  we are  unable  to  blame and punish 
individuals for their behavior. But it seems plausible that consequentialism should be concerned 
merely with producing the best possible consequences, and that holding agents responsible is what 
matters, irrespective of whether they are actually responsible or not.
There are also clear benefits in accepting COC instead of GAC. COC is a less complex theory, 
because where GAC directs itself to both individual and collective agents, COC accomplishes the 
same result by directing itself to only the universal agent. And as an added bonus, COC guarantees 
that all moral agents are given common aims, since there is now only one such agent.
Does  COC have  any practical  implications?  Not  directly,  since  it  is  not  designed  to  guide 
behavior  or  to  function  as  a  method  of  decision  making.  However,  it  may  still  benefit  the 
consequentialist theorist in other ways. Let me suggest at least two such advantages. First, COC 
may resolve some of the confusions which currently plague consequentialist views. For instance, 
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consider some of the different formulations of utilitarianism. As of today, there are extreme act-
utilitarians who hold that individuals should directly try to calculate the consequences of their acts, 
two-level utilitarians who call for working on two different levels, oscillating between a practical 
level of simple principles and a critical level for designing them, and government house-utilitarians 
who are skeptical to the whole idea of adopting utilitarianism as a personal morality, suggesting it is 
more fitting as a tool for designing public policy.53 Now, as practical strategies for bringing about 
the  best  possible  outcome,  all  of  these ideas  may very well  turn  out  useful.  When and which 
mixture of theories the utilitarian must employ is itself an interesting empirical question, not to be 
resolved from one's armchair. But sometimes utilitarians move from such practical matters to the 
similar but very different question of “which acts are really right”. They may then try to find some 
criterion of rightness, some determinate point at which they can say “when I follow this theory, I  
have accomplished what utilitarianism requires of me”. And as a consequence, they may end up 
arguing which of their specific strategies also provides the real formulation of utilitarianism. 
What I suggest is that on this most abstract level, there is no need for disagreement. All of these 
theories would do better to accept COC as a common umbrella for their views, holding that after all 
is  said  and  done,  our  ultimate  obligation  is  to  produce  the  most  utility  together.  Since  this 
overarching theory says nothing about individual behavior, nor about methods of decision making 
or of which beliefs we should acquire, it makes it abundantly clear that all strategies for individual 
conduct  are  contingent  on empirical  facts  and to  be  evaluated as  we go,  and that  whether  the 
individuals are successful depends on the effort of the group as a whole.
Second,  by accepting  COC consequentialists  may avoid some purported counterexamples  to 
their view. For example, utilitarians have often been accused of recommending individual agents to 
plug into experience machines, or to kill innocents in order to benefit the greater good. But COC 
says nothing about what we as individuals should do.  It  is therefore immune to many of these 
examples. 
I leave it an open question whether this theory is at all plausible. Let me close by tentatively 
addressing  another  worry.  As we have  seen,  collective  consequentialism claims  that  the  moral 
project cannot be realized simply by an individual doing some act, following some rules or doing 
53 Peter Singer seems to me the best example of an extreme act-utilitarian, though he might dispute the label. For  
example, see his Practical Ethics, 2Nd edn, (Cambridge, 2008 [1993]). For a discussion on two-level utilitarianism, 
see Richard Hare's Moral Thinking (Oxford, 1981), pp. 1-86, and Feldman's “True and Useful: On the Structure of a 
Two Level Normative Theory”, Utilitas 24 (2012), pp. 151-71. As for government house-utilitarianism, the classic is 
Henry Sidgwick's claim that the utilitarian's conclusions should perhaps, according to utilitarianism, be rejected by 
mankind in general. See his The Methods of Ethics (Indianapolis, 1982 [1907]), p. 490. For a more recent defense of 
this idea, see Robert E. Goodin, Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy (Cambridge, 1995).
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her  part.  It  therefore  rejects  the  very thought  of  placing  individuals  at  the  heart  of  the  moral 
enterprise. And so we may object to this theory, not because of its theoretical features, but because it 
seems to us morally repugnant. I do not know what to say of this, except that rampant individualism 
appears to me just as dangerous. I can only reiterate that while on the most abstract level only those  
acts made by the universal agent are right or wrong, this does not imply that there is nothing for us 
as individuals to try to do, or theories for us to accept. Our importance as individuals is therefore, I 
believe, not diminished by our partaking in the universal agent; on the contrary, it is precisely as 
part of this collective that we are given the ability to do what is right.
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